Under a guaranteed annuity option an insurer guarantees to convert a policyholder's accumulated funds to a life annuity at a fixed rate when the policy matures. If the annuity rates provided under the guarantee are more beneficial to the policyholder than the prevailing rates in the market the insurer has to make up the difference. Such guarantees are common in many US tax sheltered insurance products. These guarantees were popular in UK retirement savings contracts issued in the 1970's and 1980's when long term interest rates were high. At that time, the options were very far out of the money and insurance companies apparently assumed that interest rates would remain high and thus that the guarantees would never become active. In the 1990's, as long term interest rates began to fall the value of these guarantees rose. Because of the way the guarantee was written, two other factors influenced the cost of these guarantees. First, strong stock market performance meant that the amounts to which the guaranteed applied increased significantly. Second, the mortality assumption implicit in the guarantee did not anticipate the improvement in mortality which actually occurred. The emerging liabilities under these guarantees threatened the solvency of some companies and lead to the closure of Equitable Life (UK) to new business. In this paper we explore the pricing and risk management of these guarantees.
Introduction
Insurance companies often include guarantees in their products. These guarantees provide options to their policyholders which in some circumstances can be valuable to their customers. In the past some of these options have been viewed by insurers as having negligible value and were not taken into account when the products were priced and were ignored when setting up reserves. However many of these options were very long dated lasting 30 to 40 years and over this time span there can be significant fluctuations in economic variables which affect the value of these options. The case of guaranteed annuity options in the UK provides a dramatic illustration of this phenomenon and is the subject of our paper.
Guaranteed annuity options have proved to be a significant risk management challenge for several UK insurance companies. Bolton et al (1997) describe the origin and nature of these guarantees. They also discuss the factors which caused the liabilities associated with these guarantees to increase so dramatically in recent years. These factors include a decline in long term interest rates and improvements in mortality. For many contracts the liability is also related to equity performance and in the UK common stocks performed very well during the last two decades of the twentieth century.
We now describe these guarantees and explain why they became such a severe problem for the UK insurance industry. Under a guaranteed annuity the insurance company guarantees to convert the maturing policy proceeds into a life annuity at a fixed rate. Typically, these policies mature when the policyholder reaches a certain age. In the UK the most popular guaranteed rate for males, aged sixty five, was 111 per annum per 1000 and we use this rate in our illustrations. If the prevailing annuity rates at maturity provide an annual payment that exceeds 111, a rational policyholder would opt for the prevailing market rate. On the other hand, if the prevailing annuity rates at maturity produce a lower amount than 111, a rational policyholder would take the guaranteed annuity rate. As interest rates rise the annuity amount purchased by a lump sum of 1000 increases and as interest rates fall the annuity amount available per 1000 falls. Hence the guarantee corresponds to a put option on interest rates.
These guarantees began to be included in some UK policies in the 1950's and they became very popular in the 1970's and 1980's. In the UK the inclusion of these guarantees was discontinued by the end of the 1980's but given the long term nature of this business these guarantees still affect a significant number of contracts. Long term interest rates in many countries were quite high in 1970's and 1980's and the UK was no exception. During these two decades the average UK long term interest rate was around 11%. The interest rate implicit in the guaranteed annuity options depends on the mortality assumption but based on the mortality basis used in the original calculations the break-even interest rate was in the region of 5 − 6 percent. When these options were granted, they were very far out of the money and the insurance companies apparently assumed that interest rates would never fall to these low levels again and thus that the guarantees would never become active. As we now know this presumption was incorrect and interest rates did fall in the 1990's.
The guaranteed annuity conversion rate is a function of the assumed interest rate and the assumed mortality rate 1 . However there was a dramatic improvement in the mortality of the class of lives on which these guarantees were written during the period 1970-2000. This improvement meant that the break-even interest rate at which the guarantee kicked in rose. This point can be illustrated using term certain annuities of increasing length. A lump sum of 1000 is equivalent to a thirteen year annuity certain of 111 p.a. at 5.70%. However if we extend the term of the annuity to sixteen years the interest rate rises to 7.72%. Hence if mortality rates improve so that policyholders live longer, the interest rate at which the guarantee becomes effective, will increase.
Using standard actuarial notation, the value of the guarantee at maturity(time T) for the benchmark contract is
S(T ) max (
a 65 (T ) 9 − 1), 0
where S(T ) is the amount of the proceeds at time T and a 65 (T ) is market annuity rate 2 at time T for a life aged 65. The market annuity rate will depend on the prevailing long term interest rates, the mortality assumptions used and the expense assumption. We will ignore expenses and use the current long term government bond yield as a proxy for the interest rate assumption. We see that the option will have a positive value at maturity 1 Bolton et al note that when many of these guarantees were written it was considered appropriate to use a mortality table with no explicit allowance for future improvement such as a (55) .
2 In other words a 65 (T ) denotes the value at time T of an annuity of one per annum payable during the surviving lifetime of a life aged 65 (at time T ).
(be in the money) whenever the current annuity factor exceeds the guaranteed factor(9 in this case).
We see from equation (1) that for a maturing policy the size of the option liability, if the guarantee is operative, will be proportional to S(T ): the amount of proceeds to which the guarantee applies. The size of S(T ) will depend on the nature of the contract and also on the investment returns attributed to the policy. The procedure by which the investment returns are determined depends on the terms of the policy. Under a traditional UK with profits contract profits are assigned using reversionary bonuses and terminal bonuses. Reversionary bonuses are assigned on a regular basis as guaranteed additions to the basic maturity value and are not distributed until maturity. Terminal bonuses are declared when the policy matures to reflect the investment experience over the term of the contract.
The size of the reversionary bonuses depends both on the investment performance of the underlying investments and the smoothing convention used in setting the bonus level. The terminal bonus is not guaranteed but during periods of good investment performance it can be quite significant sometimes of the same order as the basic maturity sum assured. Bolton et al (1997) estimate that with profits policies account for eighty percent of the total liabilities for contracts which include a guaranteed annuity option. The remaining contracts which incorporate a guaranteed annuity option were mostly unit linked policies.
We now briefly describe unit linked contracts. In contrast to with profits contracts, the investment gains and losses under a unit linked (equity linked) contract are distributed directly to the policyholder's account. Contracts of this nature are more transparent than with profits policies and they have become very popular in many countries in recent years. Under a unit linked contract the size of the option liability, if the guarantee is operative, will depend directly on the investment performance of the assets in which the funds are invested. In the UK there is a strong tradition of investing in equities and during the twenty year period from 1980 until 2000 the rate of growth on the major UK stock market index was a staggering 18% per annum.
We see that three principal factors contributed to the growth of the guaranteed annuity option liabilities in the UK over the last few decades. First, there was a large decline in long term interest rates over the period. Second, there was a significant improvement in longevity that was not factored into the initial actuarial calculations. Third, the strong equity performance during the period served to further increase the magnitude of the liabilities. It would appear that these events were not considered when the guarantees were initially granted. The responsibility for long term financial solvency of insurance companies rests with the actuarial profession. It will be instructive to examine what possible risk management strategies could have been or should have been employed to deal with this situation. It is clear now with the benefit of hindsight that it was imprudent to grant such long term open ended guarantees of this type.
There are three main methods of dealing with the type of risks associated with writing financial guarantees. First, there is the traditional actuarial reserving method whereby the insurer sets aside additional capital to ensure that the liabilities under the guarantee will be covered with a high probability. The liabilities are estimated using a stochastic simulation approach. The basic idea is to simulate the future using a stochastic model 3 of investment returns. These simulations can be used to estimate the distribution of the cost of the guarantee. From this distribution one can compute the amount of initial reserve so that the provision will be adequate say 99% of the time. The second approach is to reinsure the liability with another financial institution such as a reinsurance company or an investment bank. In this case the insurance company pays a fee to the financial institution and in return the institution agrees to meet the liability under the guarantee. The third approach is for the insurance company to set up a replicating portfolio of traded securities and adjust (or dynamically hedge) this portfolio over time so that at maturity the market value of the portfolio corresponds to the liability under the guaranteed annuity option.
Implementations of these three different risk management strategies have been described in the literature. Yang(2001) and Wilkie, Waters and Yang(2003) describe the actuarial approach based on the Wilkie model. Dunbar(1999) provides an illustration of the second approach. The insurance company, Scottish Widows offset its guaranteed annuity liabilities by purchasing a structured product from Morgan Stanley. Pelsser(2002) analyzes a hedging strategy based on the purchase of long dated receiver swaptions.
In this paper we will discuss a number of the issues surrounding the valuation and risk management of these guarantees. We will also discuss the degree to which different risk management approaches would have been possible from 1980 onwards.
The layout of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section Two provides background detail on the guaranteed annuity options and the relevant institutional framework. We examine the evolution of the economic and demographic variables which affect the value of the guarantee. In particular we provide a time series of the values of the guarantee at maturity for a representative contract. In Section Three we use an option pricing approach to obtain the market price of the guarantee. Section Four documents the time series of market values of the guarantee. Although we use a simple one factor model it does a reasonable job of estimating the market value of the option.
Section Five examines a number of the conceptual and practical issues involved in dynamic hedging the interest rate risk. One suggestion for dealing with these guarantees involves the insurer purchasing long dated receiver swaptions. We describe this approach in Section Six. Section Seven explores the issues involved in hedging the equity risk and the mortality risk. Section Eight comments on the lessons to be learned from this episode.
Maturity Value of the Guarantee
In this section we document the evolution of the emerging liability under the guaranteed annuity option. Specifically we examine the magnitude of the guarantee for a newly maturing policy over the last two decades. In these calculations the policy proceeds at maturity are assumed to be held constant at 100. We assume, to start with, that the mortality basis used to compute the market rate corresponds to that used in the original calculations. Of course we now know that mortality improved over the period of interest but this will give us a benchmark. On the basis of the so-called a(55) mortality the break even-interest rate for a life annuity 4 is 5.61%. On this mortality 4 We assume the annuity is payable annually in arrear and has a five year guarantee period. The precise level of the break even interest rate will depend on the features of the annuity contract. These include the frequency of payment, i.e. whether it is payable monthly or yearly and also whether the annuity is assumed to be payable in advance or arrears. Bolton et al(1997) provide extensive tables of the break even interest rates for different types of annuities and different mortality tables. They assume a two percent initial expense charge which we do not include. Thus in their Table 3 .4 the value for the break even interest rate for a male aged 65 for an annuity of 111 payable annually in arrear with a five year guarantee is 5.9%. This is consistent with our figure of 5.6 % when we include their expense assumption.
basis a lump sum of 1000 will purchase an annuity of 111. If current annuity rates are calculated using this mortality assumption the guarantee will not be in the money if long term interest rates are greater than 5.61%. Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of long term interest rates in the UK since 1970. We note that rates remained quite high for the period and started to decline in the 1990's. There was a large dip in long rates at the end of 1993 and long rates first fell below 6% in 1998 and have hovered in the 4 − 6 range until the present The maturity value of the guaranteed option will depend on the long term interest rate at the policy maturity. If this market rate is 5% per 7.3% and under the PMA92(C20) table it is 8.2%. The increase in the level of the break even interest rate has profound implications for the cost of a maturing guaranteed annuity option. For example, if the long term market rate of interest is 5%, the value of the option for a maturing policy based on PMA80(C10) is 164.1 and the corresponding value based on PMA92(C20) is 293.9. Note that we do not need any type of option formula to perform these calculations. Figures 3,4 and 5 show the magnitude of the option liability for our benchmark contract under the three mortality assumptions. There is no liability on maturing contracts until the 1990's. Also note that the mortality assumption has a profound impact on the size of the liability. We have already noted that during the period 1980-2000, UK equities performed extremely well. This good equity performance resulted in increased levels of bonus to the with profits polices. For many contracts this meant that the volume of proceeds to which the guarantee applied also increased thereby increasing the liability under the guarantee. In the case of unit linked polices the gains are passed directly to the policyholder, apart from the various expenses. If we assume that a unit linked contract earned the market rate of 18% minus 300 basis points this still leaves a return of 15%. At this growth rate an initial single premium of 100 will accumulate to 1636.7 after twenty years. This growth would be directly reflected in the value of the guarantee.
To summarize, we have discussed the evolution of the value of the liability for a sequence of maturing contracts. This analysis indicates how the three factors:-
• The fall in long term interest rates
• The improvement in mortality
• The strong equity performance -served to increase the cost of the guarantee. Note that our analysis in this section did not require any stochastic analysis or option pricing formula. We simply computed the value of the option at maturity each year of the period. In the next section we discuss the evaluation of these options prior to maturity.
Derivation of Option Formula
In this section we will develop a formula for pricing the guaranteed annuity option. First we deal with simpler contracts which involve only interest rate risk. Then we introduce mortality risk as well. Finally we derive a formula for the guaranteed annuity option.
We will use the fact that the guaranteed annuity option is similar to a call option on a bond where the coupon payments correspond to the guaranteed annuity payments. We assume that the mortality risk is independent of the financial risk and that it is therefore diversifiable. We base the valuation of the option on the one factor Vasicek(1977) model. This model assumes that the short term interest rate follows a mean reverting Ornstein Uhlenbeck process and admits simple analytical solutions for bond prices and the prices of options on zero coupon bonds. In 1989, Jamshidian derived a simple formula for the price of an option on a coupon paying bond as a linear combination of options on zero coupon bonds. However neither the original Vasicek model nor the this version of Jamshidian's model reproduced the market prices of the pure discount bonds. Dybvig(1988) showed how to adjust a general one factor stochastic interest rate model so that it could reproduce the current market term structure. Hull and White(1990) also showed how to adjust the one factor Vasicek and Cox Ingersoll Ross(1985) models to be consistent with the current term structure of interest rates. In particular Hull and White noted that the extended Vasicek model is extremely tractable. We use these ideas in our development of a simple interest rate model for valuing the guaranteed annuity option.
We start by valuing a very basic contract. We assume that the price, at time t, of a zero coupon bond that will pay one unit at time s ≥ t is D(t, s). We assume an arbitrage free financial market and we also assume that there is a complete spectrum of bond maturities. To begin with, the only random variable is the interest rate. At time t we know the (market) prices of all the zero coupon bonds with maturity s ≥ t. We consider a contract that pays one unit at times (T + j), where j = 1, 2 · · · k and T > t. Note that the market value of this contract at current time t is
This result follows from the no arbitrage assumption.
We can also express the current market price of this payment stream as follows
This is because in the absence of arbitrage the prices deflated by a suitable numeraire are martingales. We can use any traded asset 8 as numeraire. Here we use the zero coupon bond which matures at time T as the numeraire and we denote the associated probability measure by the symbol Q T . Equation (2) provides a valuation formula for any payoff V (T ) and we use it extensively in the sequel.
The expected value, under Q T , of any pure discount bond with maturity (≥ T ) can be readily obtained using the same valuation formula.
The ratio on the right hand side is often called the time T forward price at t, of the pure discount bond with maturity (T + j). We now introduce mortality. We will deal with contracts where the payments are contingent upon the survival of a given life. Under an immediate annuity the life receives one unit per annum as long as he or she survives. The actuarial present value at T of an immediate annuity to a life aged R 8 whose price is always positive at T , is
where j p R represents the probability that the life aged R will survive for a further j years. The limiting age of the mortality table is denoted by ω and we set J = (ω − R). Note we use R for the age of the life at time T . It is convenient to have different notation for the are of the policyholder and for time. This actuarial present value corresponds to the expectation over the distribution of the (curtate) future lifetime of the life in question. Let τ denote the future lifetime of a life aged R at time T . Consider the random variable
D(T, T + j).
for τ = 1, 2, · · · where by convention Y (0 | T ) = 0. This random variable corresponds to the market value of an annuity certain payable for τ years. Note that D(T, T + j) is known at time T for all j. The probability that
where q R+k−1 denotes the probability that a life now aged (R + k − 1) dies in the next year ie before reaching age (R + k) . Using these probabilities, the expected value of the annuity certain payable for the random future lifetime is
The expectation here is taken with respect to the survival probabilities, P S . It is easy to show that this expectation can be converted to the expression for a R (T ) on the right hand side of equation (3). We next derive an expression for the value, at time t, of a deferred annuity. We assume the life in question is aged x at current time t. At time T ≥ t, this individual will be aged R = x + (T − t) assuming he survives. At current time t, these future payments are random variables: both with respect to mortality and also with respect to interest rates. Milevsky and Promislow (2001) discuss the valuation of insurance contracts allowing for both sources of randomness. The results are simpler if we assume that the force of mortality 9 is deterministic and for now we will make this assumption. Our assumption corresponds to the assumption of a deterministic hazard and just as in the case of credit risk this assumption leads to simpler formulae. Under this assumption the interest rate risk is independent of the mortality risk.
There is an important implication of this mortality assumption. Assume we have a life aged x at current time t. At time T > t this life will either survive and reach age R = (x + T − t) or die in the interval (t, T ). Our mortality assumption implies that we know, at current time t, the distribution of the future lifetime of the life conditional on reaching age R. In other words we can accurately predict at time, t the force of mortality that will operate during [T, T + J).
Let V (t) be the market value at time t of the deferred annuity that starts at time T . We have
where the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of Q T and P S and τ x is the future lifetime of a life aged x at time t. Because the mortality risk is assumed to be diversifiable and independent of the interest rate risk we can write
Note that the market value at time t, of the deferred annuity can be expressed as a linear combination of zero coupon bonds. Recall that R = x + (T − t). We now turn to the valuation of the guaranteed annuity option. Let G(T ) denote the value of this option at maturity. We have
where
and g is the guaranteed annuity conversion rate. In our benchmark example g = 9. Proceeding as before the value of the option at time, t is given by
Initially we assume 10 that S(T ) is independent of interest rates. We have
The last line follows because
S(t) D(t, T ) = E Q T [ S(T ) | t]
Inserting the expression for a R (T ) from (3) we have
The expression inside the expectation on the right hand side corresponds to a call option on a coupon paying bond where the payment at time (T + j) is j p R . Jamshidian(1989) noted that in the case of a one factor interest rate model this option could be expressed as a portfolio of options on zero coupon bonds. Hence we now assume that the interest rate dynamics are generated by a single factor. Specifically we assume that the short interest rate follows a one factor Ornstein Uhlenbeck process as assumed by Vasicek. Let a j = j p R so that the coupon bond value at time, T , is
Note that the market value at time, t of this coupon bond is
With this notation our call option has a value at time, T of
Let r * T denote the value of the short rate for which
where we use the asterisk to signify that each zero coupon bond is evaluated at r * T . Recall that in the Vasicek model the zero coupon bond price is specified once we know the prevailing short term interest rate. We now define K j as follows
Jamshidian proved that the market price of the option on the coupon bond with strike price g is equal to the price of a portfolio of options on the individual zero coupon bonds with strike prices K j . Specifically we have
is the price at time t of a call option on the coupon bond with strike price g and C[D(t, T + j), K j , t] is the price at time t of a call option on the zero coupon bond with maturity (T + j) and strike price K j . For the Vasicek model these call prices have simple Black Scholes expressions. We can use Jamshidian's result to obtain an explicit expression for G(t). Recall that
From the numeraire valuation equation we have
Pulling all the pieces together we have
The explicit formula for each individual bond option under the Vasicek model is
and
The parameters κ, θ and σ characterize the dynamics of the short rate of interest under the Vasicek process. The price of the zero coupon bond under this model when the short rate is r(t) is
So far we have assumed that the market price of the zero coupon bond is equal to the model price. This will not be the case for a one factor model with constant parameters. A model with constant parameters will not be able to match the shape of the yield curve at a given time. In addition it will not be able to match the variations in the yield curve over time. For the time period of interest these variations have been significant. In the UK the long term interest rate was about 14.5% during 1975 and had dropped to 5% in 2001. In the one factor Vasicek model with time independent parameters the long rate of interest is a constant:
So with constant parameters we will not be able to capture the historical experience.
We now describe Dybvig's adjustment for calibrating the model to the prevailing market prices of zero coupon bonds. This adjustment is only valid at a particular point in time. Dybvig assumed that the market prices and the model prices are determined by two short rate processes that differ only by a deterministic process. We denote this deterministic process by r b (u). We can think of this process as a correcting factor(or fudge factor) that modifies the model prices so that they agree with the market prices. Denote the market price of the zero coupon bond maturing at time s by D mar (t, s) and denote the model 11 price of the zero coupon bond maturing at time s by D mod (t, s) . The deterministic short rate process, r
In connection with the guaranteed annuity option we are interested in valuing an option which matures at time T and pays an amount a j at times (T + j) where 1 ≤ j ≤ J. The strike price of this option is g and we wish to use a one factor interest rate model that correctly prices the zero coupon bonds at time t. The value of this option at maturity time T , is max(
From Theorem 1 of Dvbvig this option has the same price at current time t as an auxiliary option. The auxiliary option has payoff at time T equal to
and it is valued using the the one factor model for the short rate. In this case the short rate model is the Vasicek model. Since we also wish to use the Jamshidian trick we denote by r * T the interest rate in the Vasicek model for which
and D * mod (T, T +j) is the zero coupon bond price at time T under the Vasicek model when the short rate at time T is r * T . For later reference we define κ j by κ j = D * mod (T, T + j) We can now state Dybvig's result for the price of an option on our bond where the bond prices are calibrated to the market and the interest rate dynamics are given by a one factor Vasicek model. The market price at time t of the option on the coupon bond is given by
is the current market price of the coupon bond,
is the formula for the price of a call option on a zero coupon bond under the Vasicek model. This option matures at time T and has a strike price of κ j and the underlying asset is the zero coupon bond maturing at time (T + j).
From our previous results we have
Proceeding as before the formula for the price of the guaranteed annuity option when we calibrate to the current term structure is
As a partial check on this last formula note that, when the model price is equal to the market price, b j = a j for all j. Under these conditions the price of the option reduces to the corresponding expression given in equation (7 ).
This formula for the guaranteed annuity option has been constructed so that it is consistent with the current term structure,(at time t) of zero coupon bond prices. However at a later time (t + h) the market prices will have changed and we will need to recalibrate the model to the new information. A new process r b (u) will be required. Dybvig comments on this unreasonable featureof such models. It is difficult to see how such a model could be used for hedging purposes. However we will claim that it could be useful for pricing purposes.
To summarize, we note that in this section we have derived a formula for the guaranteed annuity option that is based on a one factor Vasicek model for interest rates. The formula assumes independence between stock prices and interest rates. We also assumed that the mortality risk was predictable and that it could be diversified.
Valuation of Guaranteed Annuity Option
In this section we will derive a time series of market values for the guarantee based on the formula derived in the last section. It would have been helpful if the UK insurance companies had computed these market values at regular intervals since they would have highlighted the emergence of the liability under the guaranteed annuity option. The technology for pricing interest rate options was in its infancy in 1980 but by 1990 the models we use were in the public domain. We will make the case that reasonable estimates of the market value of the guarantee can be derived from the one factor stochastic interest rate model. We will use the model to estimate the value of the guarantees for the period 1980-2002. We showed in the previous section how one can modify 12 the Vasicek model to produce a one factor model that can be used to obtain a formula for the market price of the guaranteed annuity option. A similar formula has also been derived by Ballotta and Haberman(2002) . They start from the Heath Jarrow Morton model and then restrict the volatility dynamics of the forward rate process to derive tractable formulae.
In the one factor Vasicek model the short interest, r(t) follows an Ornstein Uhlenbeck (OU) process under the risk neutral (or Q) measure
dr(t) = κ(θ − r(t))dt + σdW t (10) are constants and W t is a standard Brownian motion under Q. This process is very tractable since the distribution of r(s), (s > t) is normal with mean

E(r(s)|r(t)) = e −κ(s−t) r(t) + (1 − e −κ(s−t)
)θ,
and variance
V ar(r(s)|r(t)
We used the following parameter estimates to compute the market values of the guaranteed annuity option
These parameters are broadly comparable with estimates that have been obtained in the literature based on UK data for this time period. See Nowman(1997) and Yu and Phillips(2001) . Because of the way we calibrate the model to the market term structure the option prices depend essentially on the volatility parameter. In particular because we have calibrated the option formula so that it correctly prices the zero coupon bond prices the value assumed for the parameter θ has no impact on the results. Figure 7 illustrates how the market value of the option as percentage of the current fund value changes over time. We assume that the option has remaining time to maturity of ten years so that the age of the policyholder at the option valuation date is 55. We ignore the impact of lapses and expenses and we assume that all policyholders will take up the option at maturity if it is in their interest. Our first set of calculations are based on a(55) mortality. The term structure at each date is obtained by assuming that the 2.5% consol yield operates for maturities of five years and longer and that the yields for maturities one to five are obtained by a linear interpolation between the Treasury Bill rate and the five year rate. While this procedure does not give the precise term structure at a given time it captures the shape of the term structure at that time. More importantly it also captures the secular variation in the level of long term interest rates over the time period. Figure 9 illustrates how the cost of the guaranteed annuity option for our benchmark contract varies with the volatility assumption. We used three different volatility assumptions: σ = .015, .025, .035. The market values are relatively insensitive to the volatility assumption for long periods. Indeed the only periods where we can distinguish the three separate curves corresponds to periods when the long term interest rate is close to the strike price of the option. We recall know from basic Black Scholes comparative statics that the sensitivity of an option to the volatility is highest when the underlying asset price is close to the strike price. If the option is very far out of the money or deeply in the money the price of the option is relatively insensitive to the volatility assumption. This same intuition is at work here.
At first sight it may be surprising that a simple one factor model can give reasonable estimates of the market value of the option since actual interest rate dynamics are much too complicated to be captured by such a model. The reason is that we have calibrated the model to the input term structure so that it reproduces the market prices of all the zero coupon bonds. In addition the prices are fairly robust to the volatility assumption for the realized market conditions. However we stress that such a simple model will not be adequate for hedging purposes. Hull(2002) notes The reality is that relatively simple one-factor models if used carefully usually give reasonable prices for instruments , but good hedging schemes must explicitly or implicitly assume many factors.
Hedging
In this section we discuss some of the issues involved in hedging the guaranteed annuity risk using traded securities. Although the full fledged guaranteed annuity option depends on three stochastic variables:-interest rates, stock prices and mortality-here we just discuss the interest rate risk. It turns out that the hedging of long term interest rate options is in itself a difficult task. In order to implement an effective hedging strategy we require a robust and reliable model of interest rate dynamics over the long term. The search for such a model remains an area of active 13 research and despite some useful progress there appears to be no consensus on such a model. Note that for risk management and hedging purposes we require a model that provides a good description of the actual movements in yield curves over time. In other words we need a model that describes interest rate movements under the real world or so called P-measure.
We begin by reviewing the relationship between pricing and hedging in an ideal setting. Consider the standard no arbitrage pricing model where there is a perfect frictionless market with continuous trading. If the market is complete then any payoff can be hedged with traded securities. Since there is no arbitrage the current price of the derivative must be equal to the current price of the replicating portfolio. If an institution sells this derivative then it can take the premium(price) and set up the replicating portfolio. As time passes it can dynamically adjust the position, so that, at maturity the value of the replicating portfolio is exactly equal to the payoff on the derivative. In an ideal world where the model assumptions are fulfilled it should be possible to conduct this replication program without needing any additional funds. The initial price should be exactly enough.
We can use as an example the standard Black Scholes Merton formula for the price of a European call option. In this case the underlying asset is assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion with a constant volatility parameter. The call price formula can be viewed as a portfolio with a long position in the asset and a short position in the risk free bond. To hedge this call option, an institution should continuously adjust these positions over the life of the option. If the asset price dynamics correspond to those assumed and the other assumptions are realized then the value of the replicating portfolio at option maturity will equal the payoff on the call option.
In the real world the assumptions of these models are never exactly fulfilled. For example
• The asset price dynamics will not be correctly specified.
• It will not be feasible to rebalance the replicating portfolio on a continuous basis. Instead it has to be rebalanced at discrete intervals.
• There are transaction costs on trading.
The impact of these deviations from the idealized assumptions has been explored in the Black Scholes Merton world. We discuss these three possible deviations in turn. If the process that generates the market prices deviates from the model implicit in the pricing formula there will be additional hedging errors. This is because the portfolio weights that would be required to replicate the payoff under the true model will be different from the portfolio weights computed under the assumed model. This point has been explored in the case of equity derivatives by several authors including Chen(1997,2000) , Chernov and Ghysels (2000) and Jiang and Oomen(2001) . Turning now to the issue of discrete rebalancing, Boyle and Emanuel(1980) showed that if the portfolio is rebalanced at discrete intervals there will be a hedging error which tends to zero as the rebalancing becomes more frequent.
In the presence of transaction costs the frequency of rebalancing involves a trade off between the size of the hedging error and the trading costs. However in practice we may emphasize pricing at the expense of hedging by calibrating an incorrect model to give the accurate market price of a derivative. For example quoted swaption and cap prices are universally based on the simple Black model. The Black model volatility that makes the market price equal to the model price has become a standard measure for conveying the price. However the Black model does not provide realistic dynamics for interest rates and so it is unsuitable for hedging and risk management applications. In the same way stock option prices when the asset price dynamics follow a process with stochastic volatility can still be quoted in terms of the Black Scholes implied volatility. We can always find the value of the Black Scholes volatility that reproduces the market price of the option even when the true dynamics include stochastic volatility. However as shown by Melino and Turnbull (1995) the use of the simple Black Scholes model, in the presence of stochastic volatility, will lead to large and costly hedging errors especially for long dated options.
In the case of stochastic interest rates, several studies have shown that it is possible to have a simple model that does a reasonable job of pricing interest rate derivatives even though the model is inadequate for hedging purposes. Canabarro (1995) uses a two factor simulated economy to show that although one factor models produce accurate prices for interest rate derivatives these models lead to poor hedging performance. Gupta and Subrahmanyam (2001) show using actual price data that, while a one factor model is adequate for pricing caps and floors, a two factor model performs better in hedging these types of derivatives. Suppose we use a particular interest rate model: model A for hedging purposes. Model A is used to compute the weights in the replicating portfolio. In general the better Model A reflects the way interest rates actually behave the more effective will be the hedge. Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) demonstrated that most of the variation in interest rates could be explained by three stochastic factors. Dai and Singleton (2000) examine three factor models of the so called affine In the context of guaranteed annuity options we require an interest rate 14 They are known as affine models because the short term rate of interest is a linear function of the underlying state variables.
model that describes interest rate behavior over a longer time span. Ahn, Dittmar and Gallant (2002) provide support for quadratic term structure models. They are known as quadratic models because the short term rate of interest is a quadratic function of the underlying state variables. Their empirical tests use US bond data for the period 1946-1991 and they conclude that the quadratic three factor model provides a fairly good description of term structure dynamics and captures these dynamics better than the preferred affine term structure model of Dai and Singleton. Bansal and Zhou (2002) show that the affine models are also dominated by their proposed regime switching model. Their empirical test are based on US interest rate data for the period 1964-1995. Even a casual inspection of the data suggests the existence of different regimes. They conclude that their empirical evidence provides considerable support for the regime switching model and that standard models, including the affine models with up to three factors, are sharply rejected by the data. Regime switching models have been extensively used by Hardy (2002) to model equity returns in the context of pricing and risk management of equity indexed annuities.
The interest rate exposure in a guaranteed annuity option is similar to that under a long dated swaption. Hence it is instructive to examine some recent results on hedging swaptions. This is a topic of current interest as evidenced by papers by Andersen and Andreasen (2002) Fan, Gupta and Ritchken (2001,2002) , Driessen, Klaasen and Melenberg (2002) , and Longstaff, Santa-Clara and Schwartz (2001). The main conclusion of these papers is that multi-factor models are necessary for good hedging results. However it should be noted that the empirical tests in these papers tend to use relatively short observation periods: say around three to five years. Swaption data is unavailable for long periods since the instruments first were created in the late 1980's. Hence these models are being tested over the 1995-2000 period when interest rates were fairly stable. If the swaption data were available over longer periods it seems likely that a regime switching rate model would be required to do an adequate hedging job.
Hedging with Swaptions
Swaps have became enormously important financial instruments for managing interest rate risks. They are often more suitable than bonds for hedging interest rate risk since the swap market is more liquid. Furthermore while it can be difficult to short a bond, the same exposure can easily be arranged in the swap market by entering a payer swap. Options to enter swap contracts are known as swaptions and there is now a very liquid market in long dated swaptions where the option maturities can extend for ten years and the ensuing swap can last for periods up to thirty years. Pelsser (2002) shows that long dated receiver swaptions are natural vehicles for dealing with the interest rate risk under guaranteed annuity options. In this section we discuss the feasibility of using this approach.
First some brief words concerning swaptions. A swaption is an option to enter a swap at some future time. Upon maturity of the swaption the owner of the swaption will only exercise it if the option is in the money. Suppose the swaption gives its owner the option to enter a receiver swap when the swaption matures. The counter party that enters(or is long) a receiver swap agrees to pay the floating interest rate(e.g. Libor or Euribor) and in return receive the fixed rate: known as the swap rate. If a firm owns a receiver swaption with a strike price of 7% it will compare the market swap rate with the strike rate when the swaption reaches maturity. For example if the market swap rate at maturity is 5% then the firm should optimally exercise the swaption because the guaranteed rate of 7% provides a better deal than exercising the option. It is preferable to receive fixed rate coupons of 7% than the market rate of 5%. By entering a receiver swaption an institution protects itself against the risk that interest rates will have fallen when the swaption matures. This is exactly the type of interest rate risk exposure in the guaranteed annuity option.
Pelsser shows how to incorporate mortality risk to replicate the expected payoff under the guaranteed annuity option. He assumes, as we do, that the mortality risk is independent of the financial risk and that the force of mortality (hazard rate) is deterministic. He derives an expression for the price of the guaranteed annuity option as a portfolio of long dated receiver swaptions. The advantage of his approach is that the swaptions incorporate the right type of interest rate options. Pelsser calls this approach the static hedge since there is no need for dynamic hedging. This is an advantage given the difficulty of hedging long term interest rate options with more basic securities such as bonds and swaps. However the swaption approach still has problems in dealing with the stock price risk and the risk of increasing longevity.
The Equity Risk
We have already shown in equation (1) that the size of the payoff on the UK guaranteed annuity option is a function of the amount of the maturity proceeds. This amount will depend on the stock market performance over the life of the contract. For unit linked policies the maturity amount depends directly on the performance of the underlying fund. In the case of with profits contracts the policy proceeds depend on the bonuses declared by the insurance company and the size of these bonuses is positively correlated with stock market performance. In general the better the stock market does the larger potential liability under these options. We refer to this risk as the equity risk. In this section we discuss how the inclusion of this risk impacts the pricing and risk management of the guaranteed annuity options.
We first deal with the pricing issue. We have seen in section 3 that under some strong assumptions about the joint dynamics of interest rates we can obtain simple pricing formula. Specifically if we assume that equity returns are lognormal and that interest rates are governed by a one factor Vasicek model, we can obtain a simple valuation formula for the price of the guaranteed annuity option. Although our formula assumed independence between equity returns and bond dynamics the formula can be modified to handle the case when there is correlation between stocks and bonds. Ballotta and Haberman have also derived a formula under these assumptions.
We can illustrate the key issues involved in pricing and hedging when the equity risk is included by considering a simpler contract than the guaranteed annuity option. This contract has the following payoff at time T
S(T ) max(D(T, T + j) − K, 0)
It corresponds to an option on the zero coupon bond which matures at time (T + j) and where the payoff is directly related to the value of the reference index. This contract includes no mortality risk here and there is just one zero coupon bond at maturity rather than a linear combination of zero coupon bonds. However this simpler contract captures the key dependencies of the guaranteed annuity option.
We can derive a closed form expression for the price of this contract if assume that under the forward measure (Q T ) the random variables S(T ) and D(T, T + j) have a bivariate lognormal distribution with variance-covariance
The derivation of the option price is given in the Appendix. We have
Formula (13) incorporates both equity risk and interest rate risk. We see that the option price is an increasing function of the correlation coefficient ρ. Indeed the price is quite sensitive to the value of ρ and for plausible parameter values the option price for ρ = 0 is roughly double that for ρ = −1. and half the price corresponding to ρ = 1 Correlations are notoriously difficult to forecast and so we conclude that when the equity risk is assumed to be correlated with the interest rate risk, pricing the option becomes more difficult. Of course this modifies our earlier conclusions about the effectiveness of a one factor model in pricing the guaranteed annuity option. Our earlier model assumed that the stock price movements were independent of interest rate movements.
It is now well established in the empirical literature that equity prices do not follow a simple lognormal process. There is mounting evidence that some type of stochastic volatility model does a better job of modelling equity returns. Hardy(2003) provides evidence that regime switching model does a good job of fitting the empirical distribution of monthly stock returns. Andersen Benzoni and Lund(2002) demonstrate that both stochastic volatility and jump components are present in the S and P daily index returns. Several authors 15 have shown that these models produce significant pricing deviations from the lognormal Black Scholes option prices. Thus it is unlikely that the simple model underlying equation(13) will have the flexibility to price the option accurately.
When we turn to hedging matters become worse. There are two reasons. First we require a good model of the joint dynamics of bonds and equities that will be robust over long time periods. There appears to be no obvious model that would fulfill these requirements. Second even if we are willing to adopt the pricing model in (13) the resulting hedging implementation leads to some practical problems.
To hedge the option based on this model we would need to invest in three securities. The first is an investment in the underlying equity index equal to the current market value of the option. We denote the number of units invested in the index by H 1 (t) where
The second consists of an investment of H 2 (t) units of the zero coupon bond which matures at time (T + j), where
The third consists of an investment of H 3 (t) units of the zero coupon bond which matures at time (T ), where
Note that the value of the initial hedge is
which is equal to the initial price of the option since the last two terms on the left hand side cancel one another. Suppose the hedge is to be rebalanced at time (t + h). Just before rebalancing the value of the hedge portfolio is
where S(t + h), D(t + h, T + j), D(t + h, T ) denote the market prices at time (t+h) of the three hedge assets. The new hedging weights H i (t+h), i = 1, 2, 3 are computed based on these new asset prices and the value of the revised hedge is
If the value of the hedge portfolio after rebalancing increases funds need to be added. If the value of the hedge portfolio after rebalancing goes down funds can be withdrawn. In an idealized world the hedge would be self financing. However in practice hedging is done discretely, there are transactions costs and the market movements can deviate significantly from those implied by the model. These slippages can lead to considerable hedging errors.
We saw in connection with the interest rate risk that a policy of buying appropriate portfolios of long dated receiver swaptions would cover this risk. However the presence of equity risk means that the number of swaptions has to be adjusted in line with index movements. During a period of rising equity returns an insurer would have to keep purchasing these swaptions and this would become very expensive as the swaptions began to move into the money. In these circumstances the liability under the guarantee is open ended. The swaption solution does not deal with the equity risk.
The Mortality Risk
We noted earlier that there was a dramatic improvement in annuitants mortality over the relevant period. This improvement was not anticipated when the contracts were designed and it was not factored into the design of the contracts. The effect of this improvement was to increase the value of the interest rate guarantee by raising the threshold interest rate at which the guarantee became effective. The structure of the guaranteed annuity option means that the policyholder's option is with respect to two random variables: future interest rates and future mortality rates. To isolate the mortality option, suppose that all interest rates are deterministic but that future mortality rates are uncertain. In this case the option to convert the maturity proceeds into a life annuity is an option on future mortality rates. If on maturity the mortality rates have improved 16 above the level assumed in the contract the policyholder will obtain a higher annuity under the guarantee. On the other hand if life expectancies are lower than those assumed in the contract the guarantee is of no value since policyholder will obtain a higher annuity in the open market. under the guarantee. When interest rates are stochastic the mortality option interacts with the interest rate option as we saw in Section Two. Milevsky and Promsilow(2001) have recently analyzed the twin impacts of stochastic mortality and stochastic interest rates in their discussion of guaranteed purchase rates under variable annuities in the United States. They model the mortality option by modeling the traditional actuarial force of mortality as a random variable like the hazard rate in credit risk models. The expectation of this random variable corresponds to the classical actuarial force of mortality. They show that under some assumptions the mortality option can at least in principle be hedged by the insurance company selling more life insurance. The intuition here is that if people live longer the losses on the option to annuitize will be offset by profits on the life policies sold.
While this is an innovative approach there may be some practical difficulties in implementing it. First it may not be possible to sell the insurance policies and in particular to the same type of policyholders who hold the pension contracts. Second, to implement the mortality hedging strategy the insurer requires a good estimate of the distribution of future mortality. Harking back to the UK case it would have been most unlikely for any insurer in the 1970's to accurately predict variance of the distribution of future mortality rates. If the insurer has a sufficiently accurate estimate of the variance of the future mortality rates to conduct an effective hedging strategy then it should be able to project future mortality improvements to minimize the mortality risk under the guarantee.
The mortality risk exposure facing insurers under the guaranteed annuity options could have been eliminated at inception by a different contract design. Instead of guaranteeing to pay a fixed annual amount the insurer could have guaranteed to use a certain pre specified interest rate in conjunction with the prevailing mortality assumption(in use at the time of retirement). Under this revised contract design there is no additional liability incurred if mortality improves and annuities become more expensive. This adjustment would have significantly reduced the liabilities under the guaranteed annuity options.
Lessons
We have discussed the three major types of risks in the guaranteed annuity option and examined the pricing and the feasibility of hedging the risk under these contracts. In this section we will explore the extent to which the approaches discussed in his paper could or should have been applied. We also suggest that this episode has implications for the eduction and training of the actuarial profession particulary in connection with its exposure to ideas in modern financial economics.
It is worth emphasizing that when these guarantees were being written the UK actuarial profession was still using deterministic methods to value liabilities. In particular valuation and premium calculations were based on a single deterministic interest rate. These methods were enshrined in the educational syllabus and rooted in current practice. Such methods are incapable of dealing adequately with options.
The relevant UK actuarial textbook used at the time, Fisher and Young (1965) However no guidance was provided as to what level this rate should be. Fisher and Young did suggest that conservative assumptions be used and that allowance should be made for future improvements in mortality.
The option may not be exercised until a future date ranging perhaps from 5 to 50 years hence, and since it will be relatively easy to compare the yield under the option with the then current yields it is likely to be exercised against the office. The mortality and interest rate assumptions should be conservative.
The standard actuarial toolkit in use at the time was incapable of assessing the risks under this type of guarantee. However the guarantees were granted and they gave rise to a serious risk management problem that jeopardized the solvency of a number of UK companies. For many companies, the first time that the guaranteed annuity option for maturing contract became in the money was in October 1993. In December 1993, Equitable Life announced that it would cut the terminal bonuses in the case of policyholders who opted for the guarantee. Basically this meant that the guaranteed annuity option policyholders who exercised their guarantee ended up paying for the guarantee. The affected policyholders argued that Equitable's action made a mockery of their guarantee. The validity of this controversial approach became the subject of a protracted legal dispute. Eventually, in July 2000 the House of Lords settled the matter. It ruled against the Equitable and decreed that the practice of cutting the terminal bonuses to pay for the guarantee was illegal. Equitable faced an immediate liability of 1.4 billion pounds to cover its current liability for the guaranteed annuity options and in December 2000 was forced to close its doors to new business. The oldest life insurance company in the world was felled by the guaranteed annuity option.
This entire episode should provide salutary lessons for the actuarial profession. It is now clear that the profession could have benefited from greater exposure to the paradigms of modern financial economics. An earlier recognition of the usefulness of stochastic simulation would also have helped in monitoring and managing the exposure under the guarantee.
In terms of our example we assume that the stock and the bond with maturity at time (T + j) have a bivariate lognormal distribution (at time T ) under the forward measure Q T . From the basic pricing formula we have
D(t, T + j) D(t, T ) = E Q T D(T, T + j) D(T, T ) | t = E Q T (D(T, T + j) | t)
S(t) D(t, T ) = E Q T S(T ) D(T, T ) | t = E Q T (S(T ) | t).
Hence E Q T (D(t, T + j) | t) = D(t, T + j) D(t, T ) and E Q T (S(T ) | t) = S(t) D(t, T ) .
In the Vasicek model the variance of the log of the bond price (which matures at (T + j) under the forward measure is σ The correlation between log(S(T)) and log(D(T,T+j)) under the forward measure is denoted by ρ.
The stock corresponds to S 1 and the bond corresponds to S 2 . By using these variables in equation (14) together with our basic valuation equation we obtain equation(13).
